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was legally "certain," i.e., it could be made certain by accurate survey based upon the muniments of title. Hence, when the appropriate
case of true objective uncertainty does arise,2" North Carolina counsel would seem to have had the door opened wide enough by the
Andrews2 7 dictum to argue persuasively for outright adoption of the
majority rule allowing enforcement of parol agreements in such
cases."
Such a result would accord with generally accepted public
policy considerations. 9
J. DONNELL LASSITER
Charitable Trusts-Application of Cy Pres to a Discriminatory Trust
In a recent New Jersey decision 1 the cy pres doctrine2 was
Tallassee Power Co., 204 N.C. 274, 168 S.E. 217 (1933), lacked the requisite
objective uncertainty as the court found the deeds were not ambiguous and
the boundary line could be made certain. Whether the uncertainty present
in Kirkpatrick v. McCracken, 161 N.C. 198, 76 S.E. 821 (1912), was objective in nature is inconclusive on the facts and opinion. In any event,
evidence of the subsequent parol agreement was admitted, although the
court said it felt the trial court had confined the evidence to the restricted
purpose of establishing damages.
"' And when counsel on trial is astute to make the record show that there
is objective uncertainty involved. It seems at least possible from reading
our cases that the absence up to now of clear analysis along the lines suggested may be the result of failure by counsel clearly to develop this critical
point for the appellate records.
2
'Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960).
" It is unlikely that any of the parol agreements litigated in the past were
the result of specific counsel by lawyers. Of course, in the rare instance
where the lawyer's advice is sought ahead of time, the correct counsel is to
enter into a written and recorded boundary line agreement, whether the
dispute arises out of objective or merely subjective uncertainty.
' "These settlements of disputed, conflicting, or doubtful boundaries
should be encouraged by the courts as a means of suppressing spiteful and
vexatious litigation, and thus banishing from peaceful communities a fruitful
source of discord. 'Convenience, policy, necessity, justice-all unite in sustaining such an amicable agreement.'" McArthur v. Henry, 35 Tex. 801,
816 (1869). Quoted with approval in Sobol v. Gulinson, 94 Colo. 92, 95, 28
P.2d 810, 811 (1933).
1 Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961).
2 The cy pres doctrine is an equitable doctrine applied to prevent the
failure of a charitable trust when the settlor's scheme is, or has become, impractical, impossible, or illegal to carry out. It is based on the presumption
that his wishes will more nearly be fulfilled by alteration of the trust and
its application to a purpose "as near as possible" to his original intent,
rather than declaring a partial intestacy. See, e.g., Petition of Pierce, 153
Me. 180, 188, 136 A.2d 510, 515 (1957). See generally 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 431-41 (1953); FiscH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959); 4
SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 399-.5 (2d ed. 1956); SHERIDAN & DELANY, THE CYPRES DOCTRINE (1959).
The doctrine has gained wide acceptance in the
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applied to strike the words "Protestant" and "Gentile" from a.
testamentary charitable trust. The trust was to provide scholarship
loan funds for "deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile boys of
good moral repute not given to gambling, smoking, drinking or
similar acts" at Amherst College. The college was to act as trustee.
Since its charter expressly forbids discrimination among its students
or faculty on religious grounds,' the trustees of the college refused
to serve as trustees or to co-operate with any substituted trustee.
The court found the designated purposes to be sufficiently
broad to create a charitable trust,4 the primary object of the testator's

bounty to be Amherst College rather than students of a particular
religious persuasion,' and held that under the circumstances administration of the trust by a substituted trustee would be impracticable.'
Prior to the principal case, there have been at least three instances in which a court of equity has been requested to apply thecy pres doctrine to delete discriminatory provisions from charitable
United States, but has been rejected in North Carolina. Board of Educ. v.
Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1939).

Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
§ 3.02; Note, 27 N.C.L. Rxv. 591 (1949).

But see Johnson v.

See also FIscH, supra at

'MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 84, § 6 (1824).
'The court took the position that the" 'general charitable intent' ordinarilyused by the courts articulating the doctrine does not require an intention to
benefit charity generally. It requires only a charitable purpose which is
broader than the particular purpose the effectuation of which is impossible,
impractical or illegal." Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 501, 170,
A.2d 39, 43 (1961). In support of the foregoing statement the court cited
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comment c (1935), which does not support
it. Bogert argues that the whole concept of general charitable intent is really
a fiction used to rationalize a desired result. 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supranote 2, at § 436. That seems to be the case here. See note 21 infra.
'The court considered the testator's life-long interest in Amherst, his.
contributions to alumni fund drives, attendance at class reunions, etc. The
court thus removed from consideration the possibility of settling the trust on
another institution willing to observe its restrictions. Con pare this with
Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581 (App. D.C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773'
(1944) (the Ackland Museum case), where evidence of the same nature was.
excluded. See also Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1949).
'But cf. Barclay Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489 (Orphans' Ct. 1959),
where the testatrix' intent was to assist German university students from
a particular area of Germany. Under German law a university was not
capable of accepting or administering a trust limited to a specially designatect.
class of beneficiaries. The trust did not fail but the court devised a scheme
for appointment of private trustees to administer the fund in accord with
the testatrix' wishes. The dissenter in the principal case thought the diffi-

culties of administration by a substituted trustee were not insurmountable.
Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 511, 170 A.2d 48 (1961).
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trusts,' but only in In re Dominion Students' Hall Trust,' an English case, has the attempt succeeded. This case involved a trust
devoted to the maintenance of a hostel for the benefit of male students of "European origin" from overseas dominions of the British
Empire. The cy pres doctrine was applied to delete the discriminatory restriction, for it was felt that it tended to defeat the primary
object of the trust by antagonizing the very students whom the
charity sought to benefit."
The leading American case in which this issue was raised is
Girard Will Case.x° Girard's will limited the beneficiaries of his
bounty to "poor, white male orphans," and named the City of Philadelphia as trustee. In 1954 two Negro boys were denied admission
to Girard College solely on the ground that they were not white.
Suit was brought against the Board of Directors of City Trusts.
The Mayor of Philadelphia and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania intervened as co-plaintiffs. One of the arguments before the
Orphans' Court" was that the "white" restriction was against the
public policy of Pennsylvania and the United States, and that the
' The question of what to do about religious restrictions in a trust usually
arises where the fund has become inadequate to carry out the testator's purpose, or where the designated trustee has ceased to exist. See, e.g., Matter
of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916) (insufficient funds);
People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N.E. 944 (1913) (trustee
no longer in existence). See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 78 (1949).
Religious restrictions were completely ignored in First Trust Co. v. Thompson, 147 Neb. 366, 23 N.W.2d 339 (1946); cf. Application of Italian Benevolent Inst., 157 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1956). But see In re Rupprecht's
Will, 271 App. Div. 376, 65 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1946), aff'd without opinion, 297
N.Y. 462, 74 N.E.2d 175 (1957); Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H.
207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946).
8 [1947] Ch. 183 (1946). See Note, 14 SOL. 140 (1947). See also In re
Queen's School, [1910] 1 Ch. 796. The school's endowment trust required
the head mistress to be a communicant of the Church of England. In order
to obtain government aid the trustees requested the court to delete this
provision. The suit was successful, but through alteration of a previous cy
pres scheme drawn by the Charity Commissioners in 1900.
9 [1947] Ch. at 186. It is submitted that this decision was not cited in
the principal case because Dominion Students did not involve a testamentary
trust but one created by private subscription, and it appeared that at least
seventy-five per cent of the subscribers favored deletion of the "European"
restriction. There was, therefore, no substantial question of what the settlor
of the trust would have preferred had he foreseen a failure of the purpose of
his trust. The court's path in Dominion Students was also smoothed by the
fact that it was not actually an adversary proceeding. Although the Attorney General was the nominal defendant, he argued in support of the plaintiff's petition. Id. at 185-86.
1

386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).

" Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
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court should exercise the cy pres power to strike the racial restriction. 2 The court held that the city in administering the trust
was not performing a governmental function; that there was therefore no illegality of purpose; and that there had been no failure of
purpose since there was no shortage of white applicants. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 3 The United States Supreme Court in a per curiam decision reversed and remanded,' 4
holding that the city could not administer a racially discriminatory
trust on the authority of Brown v. Board of Educ.'5 The orphans'
court seized on the loophole and merely replaced the Board of City
Trusts with thirteen private trustees.'" Again the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed.'
A vigorous dissent argued that it was
impossible to read Girard's will without reaching the conclusion that
" The case was argued primarily on other grounds. Cy pres was sought
as an alternative remedy. For an excellent discussion of the sociological
implications of Girard and the use of sociologists and political scientists
as expert witnesses in this case, see Gordon, The Girard College Case:
Desegregation and a Municipal Trust, 304 Annals 53 (1956).
" Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956). The court stated
that "to sanction a change in the express terms of the will of Stephen
Girard . . . would, in the opinion of the court, be a wholly unwarranted and
improper decision unjustified by any principle of applicable law." Id. at
569-70, 127 A.2d at 297. See Note, 18 U. PiTT. L. Ruv. 620, 630 (1957).
" Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
(1957).
19347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 This opinion is not reported.
17 Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
In the
first Girard decision the Pennsylvania court relied heavily on its holding that
the city could legally administer this trust in support of its refusal to apply
the cy pres doctrine. That holding was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court; yet it does not appear that on remand of the case any attempt
was made to revive the cy pres argument; at least the court in their
final disposition of the case did not say so. Even the dissenter failed to make
any reference to cy pres relief. The case was severely criticized in the
reviews. See, e.g., Notes, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 152 (1959); 33 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 495 (1958). A like result was reached on similar facts in Mills v. City
of Philadelphia, 52 N.J. Super. 52, 144 A.2d 728 (Super. Ct. 1958) (cy pres
was not argued). See Note, 39 B.U.L. Ray. 140 (1959); cf. Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
721. But see Moore v. City & County of Denver, 133 Colo. 190, 292 P.2d
986 (1956), decided two years before Girard. In Moore the City of Denver
had been appointed trustee of a trust establishing a college for "poor, white
male orphans"; "orphans" was defined as children whose fathers were dead
(obviously patterned after the Girard trust). Suit was brought to enlarge
the class of beneficiaries since a large surplus had accumulated. Apparently,
no objection was made to the "white" restriction. The court there pointed
out that the plaintiffs had not shown that the testator's directions could not
be observed and that cy pres had no application. There is no reported case
indicating the fate of this trust after the Girard decisions.
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he would have preferred deletion of the word "white" to removal
of the city as trustee. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.18

LaFond v. City of Detroit,9 a later case, involved a will providing for the establishment of a public playground for white children. The city accepted the gift provided the court would construe
the will as giving it the right to make the facilities available to all
children, without regard to race, color or creed. An evenly divided
court affirmed a holding that the trust was void as against public
policy and contrary to the laws of Michigan and the United States.
Exercise of the cy pres power to strike the word "white" was denied
on the ground that the testratrix had not evinced a general charitable
intent.2"

An analysis of the decision in the principal case in the light of
the three cases discussed above indicates four conditions necessary
to success: (1) the court must find that the testator manifested a
"general charitable intent" ;21 (2) there must be some factor beyond
the trustee's control which makes it impossible, impractical or illegal
for him to administer the trust so long as it contains the discriminatory provision ;21 (3) there must be some factor, which may or
" Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570,
rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
"°357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959), noted with approval in Note, 35
NomTE DAME LAw. 277 (1960); disapproved in Note, 37 U. DET. L.J. 418
(1960).
" Three Justices thought the testatrix' primary intent was not to benefit
charity generally but to benefit white children. The dissenters thought that
this position was unwarranted by the evidence and felt that cy pres should
have been exercised to strike the word "white." 357 Mich. at 372, 98
N.W.2d at 535.
1
As pointed out by Professor Bogert, the decisions on general charitable intent are impossible to reconcile. 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4,
at § 437. Given practically identical language in a will, one court will find
the requisite intent while another will hold it to be lacking. This intent
seems to be a fictional disguise for a decision in which considerations of
public policy may outweigh the sanctity of the right of testamentary disposition of property. It is much easier to avoid the weighing of these propositions by finding no "general charitable intent." But even here the court is
often forced to determine that the testator would prefer that his trust fail
rather than have it altered. This seems to be the case in Lafond v. City of
Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959). There is no substantial distinction to be seen in the language of that bequest and that of the principal
case so far as "general charitable intent" is concerned.
" Thus, a distinction is drawn between the trustee who by his own act
creates or contributes toward the impossibility, impracticability or illegality
of the trust and one who merely renders a particular remedy impractical.
See note 24 infra.
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may not be within the trustee's control, which makes the appointment of a substituted trustee impractical, or contrary to the testator's
intent ;23 (4) finally, there must be a finding that administration of
the trust by the designated institutional trustee is the primary object
of the testator 2 4 -otherwise the court will settle the trust on an
institution willing to observe its restrictions.
Although the court in the principal case justified its application
of the cy pres doctrine primarily on grounds of the testator's intent,
it is submitted that public policy would also have been sufficient
grounds for extension of the doctrine in this type of case.25 Application of the cy pres doctrine is certainly preferable to declaring the
trust void as in LaFond, and the almost universal criticism of
Girard indicates that the court's refusal there to delete the racial
2 This condition would seem to be peculiar to colleges or like eleemosynary institutions, for there the benefit to be derived from the trust may have
a dual nature: not only are the eventual recipients of scholarships or loans,
for example, benefitted by the trusts providing them, but the college is
assisted in attracting able students through their existence. And the
testator may have intended to confer both benefits without preference of one
over the other. The court so held in the principal case and refused to make
a choice between them.
"' This would seem to be an extension of the cy pres doctrine to allow
alteration of the trust rather than removal of the trustee where the trustee
is unable to accept the trust as it stands, and it appears that the settlor
selected that particular trustee for more than administrative purposes. In
Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
testatrix had devised money to West Point for construction of an alumni
house at a specified location on the campus; the academy wished to use the
money to construct another building. The court refused to apply the cy pres
doctrine, stating that "cy pres. . . does not authorize or permit a court to
vary the terms of a bequest . . . merely because the variation will meet the
,desire or suit the convenience of the trustee. Nor may a trustee by his own
act produce changed conditions which frustrate the donor's intention and still
claim the gift through application of the cy pres doctrine." Id. at 497.
Accord, President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1925); Hicks Memorial Christian Ass'n v. Locke, 178 Ark. 892,
12 S.W.2d 866 (1929). But cf. Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843
(1949), discussed in Note, 63 HARv. L. Rnv. 348 (1949); Hoffman Estate,
15 Pa. D. & C.2d 295 (Orphans' Ct. 1959); In re MacFarland's Estate, 95
N.Y.S.2d 258 (Surr. Ct. 1950). The court in the principal case dis-tinguished Connecticut College v. United States, supra, on the grounds that
there the impossibility was within the control of the Academy and was actually created by its own act. Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 484, 510, 170
A.2d 39, 47 (1961).
" 5The lower court in the principal case observed that the New Jersey
-anti-discrimination statute had no application to the case since it expressly
,exempted private educational institutions from its provisions. Howard Say.
Inst. v. Trustees of Amherst College, 61 N.J. Super. 119, 160 A.2d 177
(Super. Ct. 1960). See N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, ch. 25, § 5(j) (Supp.
1961).
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Removal of the trustee

designated by the testator will often be more of a subversion of his
intent than altering the trust in other ways. And, as the principal
case indicates, in some circumstances the appointment of substituted
trustees might effectively destroy the main purpose of the trust.
If a state-supported college or university were to receive a
bequest providing scholarships for "white" students only, the Girard
case indicates clearly that the university, being an arm of the state,
could not administer such a trust without violating the fourteenth
amendment. If it be found that the testator intended primarily to
benefit the university by his bequest and that the university refused
to co-operate with a substituted trustee, the principal case seems to
offer a workable and equitable solution. A college receiving a
bequest establishing a trust restricted to a particular race or religion
which it cannot legally or in good conscience administer, should not
to be forced to choose between repudiating it altogether or accepting
it as is, if it may do so at all. Ultimately the problem is resolved
into a balancing of two interests thus brought into conflict: the
interest of the college and the public in making the college's facilities
available to qualified students without regard to race or religion, and
the interest of the testator in the unfettered right to dispose of his
property as he sees fit. 7 In most cases the former should outweigh
the latter, for the advancement of learning and the protection of civil
liberties would seem to be more worthy goals than blind respect
for the supposed intent of the dead hand.
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL

Constitutional Law-Inadmissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence
in State Criminal Proceedings
In a recent decision' the United States Supreme Court held that

" See Clark, CharitableTrusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard,66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957), and Notes cited in notes 13 and
17 szpra.
27

See note 21 supra.

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). (Justice Stewart concurred in
result only.) Cleveland police officers, having information that a person
wanted for questioning about some bombings was hiding out in defendant's
home, broke into defendant's home, waving a piece of paper which they
claimed was a warrant, and thoroughly searched the house. During this
search they found the obscene materials, for the possession of which the
defendant, Mrs. Dollree Mapp, was convicted under the provisions of OHIo
REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1961). On trial no search warrant was pro1Mapp

